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CHINA’S URBAN CONSTRUCTION INVESTMENT BOND: CONTEXTUALISING 
A FINANCIAL TOOL FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Abstract. This paper examines the Urban Construction Investment Bond (UCIB) as a tradable 
product in the financial market and a financial tool for local government in China. The
development of this financial product is contextualised in infrastructure finance and local 
government debt. The creation of UCIB helps finance infrastructure investment and potentially 
reveal the relative risks through the secondary market. The spatial distribution of UCIB
demonstrates different relative risks of this financial instrument in local conditions. The
government uses this financial tool to bridge the emerging capital market and infrastructure 
finance, and the Chinese financial market now treats UCIB as an emerging asset class. The
development of UCIB has sped up the pace of financialisation in China. Although relative risks 
help investors choose different UCIBs, the overall risk of UCIB cannot be ignored. 
Key words: urban construction investment bond, financialisation, relative risks, infrastructure
finance, China
1 Introduction
This study examines Urban Construction Investment Bond (UCIB) or Chengtou Bond
as a species of local government debt in China, one that both reflects and mobilises the 
increasing pace of financialisation in China and the emergence of increasingly liquid capital
markets (Tao et al, 2010; Tsui; 2011; Wong, 2013; Ye and Wu, 2014; Liu, 2019; Wu, 2019;
Feng et al, 2020). There has been a growing strand of the literature on UCIB in China (Ambrose
et al, 2015; Ansar et al, 2016; Pan et al, 2017; Huang and Du, 2018; Wu, 2019; Horn et al,
2019). We argue that existing researches tend to focus on absolute level rather than relative
level of risks, which in turn promotes confusion about the potential significance of UCIB as 
part of the toolkit available to local governments. Absolute level of risk is associated with the 
stock and flow of UCIB, whereas relative risk, viewed from the perspective of financial 
instrument and market, is measured by adding an additional risk premium or spread relative to 
a benchmark such as the return of 10-year government bonds. Relative risk premium is a 







   




    
 
    
 
  
    
   
   
  
  
    
     
 
    
  
 
   
  
 
    
    
     
    
    
   
  
   
compensate investor for the risk of holding asset such as UCIB relative to the 10-year
government bond. In this paper, we examine both absolute and relative risk in China’s UCIB
in order to better contextualise the UCIB. 
Largely confined to domestic holders, the Chinese internal bond market was estimated
at around 13 trillion USD, the third in the world after the US and Japan; China is becoming
increasingly an important region to global asset managers and institutions (CNBC, 2019). The 
UCIB is used primarily to finance infrastructure and is classified as a sub-sovereign bond (Bo
et al, 2017). The total outstanding stock of UCIB in China was estimated at 1.14 trillion USD 
by the end of 2018 (Wind, 2018). To the outside world, there is generally a lack of 
understanding of the institutions of the Chinese bond market in general, the market
microstructure, and the issuance and distribution of UCIB by capital market in particular. 
Furthermore, these financial instruments remain largely inaccessible to outside investors as 
China’s internal financial markets remain closed. The debut of China Bond Connect in 2017 
represented a major milestone in the opening of China’s capital market. In this context, the 
research in this paper seeks to understand the UCIB as an emerging asset class in China’s
financial market and as a tool for local governments. Our study has two main goals: firstly, to 
understand the role of Chinese capital market in financing infrastructure, secondly, to apply 
the framework of relative risk analysis in order to contextualise the Chinese UCIB as a species
of local government debt.
Our empirical research makes several contributions to understanding the spatial and
temporal dynamics of the UCIB. Firstly, we find attributes of spatial layer of risk being an 
important explanation for risk premium across China’s regions. The UCIB issued by different 
regions comes with different location specific risk premia, an important source of relative risk
that brings with it benefit of spatial diversification. Secondly, the UCIB acts as an important
gauge for China’s economic infrastructure and the investment-driven economy and serves as a 
bridge between China’s emerging regional capital markets and the regional real economy. We
argue that existing scholarship has understated the full potential and contribution of 
infrastructure as an asset class to China’s financial system, and strategic role played by the
state and the capital market in financing infrastructure in China. We argue institutions matter 
in the process risk transformation. From the perspective of financial market, the UCIB which








   
        
   
     
 
 
    
     
  
      
  
   
  
     
       
  
  









    
     
  
       
  
    
cycle. In contrast to the global banking system of the last financial crisis which wreaks havoc 
with the real economy and pushes the world towards the recession, the banking system in China
has seized the opportunity from the crisis to invest in long term infrastructure. As China’s
financial market continues to mature, the UCIB offers new opportunities as an asset class with
stable, long-term yield to both domestic and international investors and thus is a valuable
species of local government debt. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, we review the literature on
the UCIB and explain why relative risk premium offers an alternative approach to
understanding the risks associated with the UCIB. Second. We introduce our framework of 
analysis and provide the context for understanding the UCIB as an asset class. Third, we
examine where the risks come from, how relative risks interact with spatial and temporal
factors embedded in locality through the pricing mechanism. Finally, based on the preceding
analysis, we conclude that UCIB is integral to the future development of China’s infrastructure
systems and capital markets. The future of UCIB depends on its potential as an asset class
which bridges the growth of regional real economies and growth of regional capital markets,
which are part of China’s longer-term path of financialisation. The continuous development of 
domestic capital markets particularly increasing participation by private sector, and the demand
for UCIB placed through different methods offers an investment tool which helps to provide
for China’s long-term future. 
2 Literature Review
2.1 Yield Spread as Risk ‘Barometer’
Yield spread measures the difference between the yield or return from one instrument 
to a benchmark. In finance and economic literature, there is a long strand of literature on risk 
attributed to yield spread due to its widespread use by economic forecasters and the finance 
industry. Economic forecasters in the central banks such as the US Fed have used various yield
spreads of government bonds to forecast economic recession (Estrella and Mishkin, 1998;
Gilchrist and Zakrajsek, 2012; Bauer and Mertens, 2018; Engstrom and Sharpe, 2019). 
Forecasters believe that yield spreads contain information on the likelihood of future economic 










   
  
  
    
  
      
     
   
     
  
 
   
     
    
    
    
 
   
      
      
  
   
 
   
  
   
 
2005), Italy (Brunetti and Torricelli, 2009), Germany (Nyberg, 2010.) and Japan (Hasegawa
and Fukuta, 2011).
In the finance literature, there are two strands of literature on yield spreads. The first 
strand of literature focuses on the corporate yield spread and the impact on yield spread of
macroeconomic factors. For example, Guha and Hiris (2002) revealed that benchmark interest
rate has a direct effect on yield spread - when the economy was depressed, the bond’s credit 
spread would be widened and when the economy improved, the bond’s credit spread would be
narrowed. In other words, the level of yield spread serves as a ‘barometer’ of risk to the
economy. The change in corporate credit spread responds to the greater impact of the market 
(Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein, 2001) and the negative correlation between the growth rate of
the gross national product and the bond spread is explained by the default risk and the market 
conditions of bond spread (Tang and Yan, 2008). 
The second strand of finance literature focuses on risk premium and volatility 
associated with yield spreads at the micro level. For example, Elton et al (2001) showed that
the default risk, revenue, liquidity risk and other systematic risks were the main factors that
affected the bond’s credit spread. The liquidity premium, the risk premium and the anticipatory
breach of contract were important causes on the bond’s credit spread (Brown et al, 2001; Covitz 
and Downing, 2007). Furthermore, there is a growing body of literature which focuses on the 
volatility of yield spread, starting from Campbell and Taksler’s seminal article on option 
pricing and credit spread (2003), Cremers et al. (2008) found that implied market volatility is 
significantly related to credit spreads. To sum, the focus of economic and finance literature has
been on the use of yield spreads as a forecasting tool while seeking to understand the causes of 
credit spreads, and particularly ‘micro’ factors that impact on yield spread. 
The yield spread contains information about the future state of the economy and is 
instrumental as a ‘barometer’ of risk to the wider economy. Frequently used by financial
analysts, the government yield spread or G-spread measures the difference between a bond’s 
yield to maturity (YTM) to that of matched duration or to a long duration sovereign bond. The 
spread or the difference between the two represents ‘micro’ level relative risk or excess return 
for bearing greater credit and liquidity risks, that is above the rate of return for the benchmark













   
   
  
       
  
    
  
   
  
       
      
  
 
   
 
   
     
   




   
      
    
 
as expected inflation rate and expected real rate of interest are already embedded within the 
subtracted component of the benchmark sovereign yield, government yield spread specifically 
measures ‘micro’ aspects of relative risk premia such as credit, liquidity and sector risks. The 
greater the spread above the benchmark, the larger the idiosyncratic, mark-up ‘micro’ aspects 
of risk premia for holding specific bond or bond indexes.
This relative measure of risk and volatility has its origin in the approach of fixed income
analysis widely used in the industry (Petitt et al, 2019). Jubinski and Lipton (2012), for
example, found that bond yields and spreads respond to changes in equity market volatility in 
a manner consistent with a flight-to-quality effect, and both short and long-term Treasury yields
fall in response to increases in implied volatility. However, little is known about how 
idiosyncratic, ‘micro’ aspects of government yield spreads across maturities and ratings 
spectrum systematically influenced and influenced by the volatility of equity and sector 
specific indexes and broader macroeconomic variables. In order to elaborate the novelty of the
UCIB as a species of local government debt, the present study incorporates a relative risk 
framework based on government yield spreads to measure ‘micro’ aspects of relative risk
premium; and secondly, decomposes relative risk premium into finer risk layers specific to
UCIB. We further unpack ‘micro’ aspects of relative risk premium by attribution to spatial
difference and the term structure across rating and maturity spectrum.
2.2 Relative Risk Premium in China’s UCIB 
In terms of the literature on UCIB in China, the focus has been on absolute risk, e.g. 
the flow and stock of UCIB and its interaction with macroeconomic variables such as growth
(Ambrose et al, 2015; Ansar et al, 2016; Pan et al, 2017; Horn et al, 2019). Our approach
instead involves decomposing the geographical composition of relative risk in order to tease
out the ‘micro’ aspects of risk, rather than focussing on absolute measures such as aggregates
of stock and flow or on fiscal constraints and GDP growth. 
For example, Province A might have accumulated a higher level of stock while having
a larger flow of UCIB but can also achieve, in relative terms, a lower cost of capital due to the
presence of a well-developed financial market and realised lower financing cost from past







       
   
      
     
    
  
 






   
   
 
  
    
  
     
      
 
       
    




   
      
    
 
Province A could be much lower than Province B when Province B had lower stock and flow
of UCIB but higher cost of capital due to the absence of developed financial market and much
higher financing cost. Thus, in terms of absolute risk, Province A might be higher than B due
to a larger stock and flow of UCIB. However, in terms of relative risk, Province A could be
lower than B due to lower government yield spread revealed through past interactions with
capital market. The extent to which government yield spreads for China’s UCIB are 
systematically affected by relative risk factors attributed to spatial difference and instrument 
level ‘micro’ risk factor is the focus of this paper. By elaborating these dynamics, we are able
to demonstrate the contribution that UCIBs make to the possible tools that local governments
have for raising infrastructure finance.
3. Method 
To understand risk and the volatility of risk – i.e. why bond prices and yields-to-
maturity change - is useful to first separate yield to maturity into two components: the 
benchmark and the spread. The benchmark yield for a corporate bond with 8% yield to maturity 
and 10 years’ time to maturity is the base rate, a 10 years government bond. If the yield to 
maturity of 10 years government bond is 5%, the government yield spread (3%) is the
difference between corporate bond’s yield to maturity (8%) and the benchmark 10 years
government bond (5%). The higher the level of the spread the riskier the bond. Government
yield spread, therefore, serves effectively as excess return or additional compensation for
bearing some additional idiosyncratic risks above the benchmark ‘risk free’ government bond.
Government yield spread can measure the difference between a bond’s yield to maturity
(YTM) to that of matched duration or long duration (typically 10 year) sovereign bond. The 
spread or the difference between the two represents ‘micro’ level, relative risk premium or
excess return/risk premium for bearing greater credit and liquidity risks, a mark-up to ‘risk 
free’ rate of return of the benchmark sovereign yield. Finance professional typically use 10-
years sovereign/government bond as a proxy for ‘risk free’ rate of return. The meaning of ‘risk
free’ rate is the minimum threshold level of return investor must be satisfied before anything 
else is considered. Risk in addition to ‘risk free’ rate requires additional compensation. Since
‘risk free’ rate already includes key macroeconomic risk factors such as inflation, interest rate







    
 
 
   
   
    
    
    
  
   
   
 
       
      
      
   
  
     




     
  
 
    
  
  
   
                                                 
   
    
‘riskier’ and would need to be compensated with a mark-up relative risk premium above ‘risk
free’ rate. 
Therefore, government yield spread specifically measures ‘micro’ aspects of relative
risk premia. The greater the spread above the benchmark, the larger the idiosyncratic, marked-
up ‘micro’ aspects of risk premia for holding specific bond or bond indexes. In the context of 
UCIB, government yield spread measures UCIB’s sector risk and spatial risk associated with
different regions/cities in China where the UCIB was issued, both are marked-up risk premium
given the idiosyncrasy of different regions/cities in China and sector specific characteristics of 
UCIB as a construction bond. Additional ‘micro’ aspects of UCIB such as maturity and default 
risks are also included and will be ‘priced’ in the spread above benchmark rate based on time
to maturity and equivalent credit rating.
For example, as shown in Figure 1, 16 Jiang Ning UCIB 1 (1680452.IB and 139292.SH) 
was issued in 10 November 2016 to be retired in 11 November 2023 (7 years’ Time to Maturity
from issue). On 21 August 2019 (dotted blue line demarcated end point on the graph), the bond
was trading at a discounted price of 99.217 RMB (red line measured on the left vertical scale). 
Yield to maturity was 3.681% (green line measured on the right vertical scale). On the same
day, the yield of 10 years government bond was 2.816%. The difference between the two was 
0.86% (86 basis point) is the relative risk premium for holding 16 Jiang Ning UCIB as
compared with holding a ‘risk free’ 10 year’s government bonds. 
Insert Figure 1
Pricing 16 Jiang Ning UCIB as a financial asset with higher risk than government bond, 
investors would demand 0.86% or 86 basis point more to compensate for the risk of holding 
16 Jiang Ning UCIB in excess of ‘risk free’ government bond. Because the yield to maturity is 
inversely related to the price of the bond as shown, the higher the yield/risk the lower the price
of the bond and vice versa, with price reflecting the force of demand and supply for bond. 
Relative risk, as defined here, will vary depending on the spread between individual bond and
10-year government bonds. The spread narrows as risk decreases. The spread widens as risk
1 The issuer is Jiang Ning City Construction Company Limited, a Local Government Financing Platform







   
 
 
   
    
 
    
 
   
  
   
   
  




      
    
     
   
    
    









goes up. Additional risk measure can also be developed to gauge if the bond has lower or higher
maturity risk by reference to equivalent duration, e.g. 7-year UCIB bond.
Relative risk as described above is the spread difference between UCIB and equivalent
duration government bond or 10-year government bond. The level of relative risk represents
‘micro’ aspects of risk in excess of the government benchmark. The first order derivative of 
risk premia can be modelled to the volatility of idiosyncratic, ‘micro’ aspects of risk to the 
changes in a broad set of ‘macro’ variables such as inflation, interest rate and country risk
premium, which have already been included within the yield of government bond. Holding 
these ‘macro’ risk factors constant, we can decompose ‘idiosyncratic’, ‘micro’ aspects of risk 
to two factors: (1) exposure to different region/city given the size of the Chinese economy and
sub-sovereign nature of UCIB, (2) exposure to overall sectoral influences, (3) maturity and
default risks. From the point of view of spatial change, UCIB has the first layer that is very 
different from other type of sub-sovereign debt. For this purpose, we focus on spatial risk layer 
for UCIB and shows how the landscape of relative risk changes in order understand how 
changes vary across China. 
These relative measures on the level of risk, volatility of relative risk and its dynamic
properties across space and time can be used in risk pricing and offer timely measures to 
understand risk as it emerges from instrument level. Traditionally, economic forecasters and 
financial analysts have used relative risk as key indicator. Using these tools, the study seeks to
extend the analysis to UCIB and broaden the scope of the existing fixed income analysis to 
capture risks and geographical component of risk to this asset class. The approach seeks to 
decompose geographical and ‘micro’ aspects of risk which made up relative risk premium. Our 
method allows us to understand the key drivers of relative risks in the context of China’s UCIB 
and extends such analysis to UCIB as an asset class with over 10 years’ time span, thereby
allowing us to reappraise the utility of the UCIB as a tool for risk diversification by local 
governments as well as investors.
4 The Development of the UCIB and Local Government Debt
The UCIB is one of several forms of infrastructure financing mechanisms in China
which belong to a broad category of local government debt or sub-sovereign debt as compared 








    
    
   
 
   
   






   
  
  















   
China for nearly thirty years. In 1992, the central government allowed Shanghai Urban
Construction Investment Company to issue 500 million RMB Pudong Construction Bond,
China’s first UCIB. Since then, UCIB has grown year by year and accelerated into a major
asset class for the bank and financial institutions. Despite significant expansion, the distribution 
of UCIB across China has been very uneven. Top 5 regions such as Jiangsu, Tianjin, Beijing, 
Zhejiang and Hunan made up a large share of issuance by number and volume. Jiangsu
province, by far, has the largest share of issuance and volume. As shown on Table 1, developed 
eastern region shared 44.3% of total issues and 37.8% of volume, as well as, lower cost of 
capital such as yield to maturity.
Insert Table 1
In contrast, between 2007 and 2016, the average growth rate increased to 21%. In 19 
years (1997-2016) the absolute growth rate increased by 289%. Concerned with the overall
level of debt and especially ‘covert’ debt, the National Audit Office (NAO) launched a nation-
wide audit in 2011. A new budget law then came into the force in 2015 to regulate local 
government finance (Bo et al, 2017). Since then, the overall growth of local government debt 
has been on a path of steep decline from 33% in 2014 to 10% in 2018, correspondingly, the
speed of growth for infrastructure has come down as well, from around 25% around 2014 to
less than 5% in 2018 (Li and Li, 2019).
By 2015, the Chinese government had decided to put the brake on to deleverage the 
economy, which resulted in rapid decrease of UCIB issuance. The government policy followed 
supply side economics was to deleverage the Chinese economy particularly the real estate 
sector. As a result, the combined leverage ratio for China, measured by total debt to GDP has 
come down in 2018 (NBS, 2018). Old debts particularly covert type of sub-sovereign-debt 
(such as UCIB held by LGFP) have been progressively converted (Zhai Wu Zhi Huan) into
new debt to reduce maturity risk. By 2019, local governments have almost completed the 
conversion of 16 trillion of old debt (2.37 trillion USD) into new type of debt instrument such
as project bond for local government (CCDC, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019; Liang and Liu, 2019).   
Defined by the issuing entity, local government debt can be divided into three broad









    
    
   
    
 




      
     
    
  
      
    
  







   
  
   
    
  
     
                                                 
   
   
or via the Ministry of Finance. The second category is the loan directly borrowed by the local
government. The third category is the local government financing platform (LGFP) or
Chengtou bond set up by the local government to engage in (1) borrowing via loans from
various channels, primarily via commercial banks, (2) issuing UCIB (Urban Construction
Investment Bond), (3) financing medium-term notes2. Budgetary debt issued by the Ministry 
of Finance for local government faces hard budget constraint and is considered as an overt form
of debt (Xian Xing Zhai Wu), whereas the second and third category (LGFP) tend to be extra
budgetary, face soft budget constraints and are generally considered as covert debt (Yin Xing
Zhai Wu). The UCIB is considered to belong to the latter category.
The estimate was rebased using this distinction in Table 2 between Overt and Covert 
debt (Pei 2009). Overt debt (Xian Xing Zhai Wu) is defined by legal contract which clearly
states government’s liability and can be identified by the budget report. On the other hand,
Covert debt (Yin Xing Zhai Wu) is extra budgetary and generally considered risky because local 
government either uses its own credit to provide guarantees or guarantees by collateralising the 
future revenue or publicly owned land, hence, the government can be held liable in the future.
Drawing a line between covert and overt debt creates a false distinction and causes confusion. 
The line can be drawn many ways by including different types of state-owned enterprises or 
according to organisational modes with mixed ownership. The distinction is not always clear 
in the category of covert debt. Our estimate, presented in Table 2, rebased local government
debt and national debt taken from various domestic and international sources.
Insert Table 2
From the perspective of the financial market, what matters is whether the entity
concerned has debt servicing capacity, in other words, can the future stream of cash flow
sustain the future schedule of debt repayment. In this context, the basic valuation matrix on
debt by the financial market are time to maturity, duration, yield to maturity and debt service
coverage ratio, as will be explained below by applying relative risk framework. From the
perspective of investor, the question is whether the UCIB risk premium is appropriately
2 Medium-term notes are securities that are offered continuously to investors by an agent of the issuer. They can







    
     
   
   




    
      
  
    
 
 
   
   
 
   








    
     
  
   
  
benchmarked above equivalent duration sovereign or government bonds and whether the rating 
accurately reflects the level of risks. In terms of credit, different bonds issued by different local 
governments come with different ratings which reflect credit-worthiness, liquidity, maturity
and yield differences across regions and the state of the local economy. In terms of total risks,
the UCIB is generally considered higher risk than government bond but lower risk than
corporate bonds, and have higher seniority and less volatility than equity, which in relative 
terms, can be an asset class of its own. 
5 Spatial Distribution of Relative Risks
The relative risk method proposed by this paper measures risk premium as the
difference between UCIB and the benchmark government bond. This allows us to model spatial 
dimension of risk to reveal the broad pattern of concentration and dispersion, as a financial 
instrument which strong regional/city characteristics. 
Figure 2 shows the spatial distribution of UCIB in 2012 and 2016. Four clusters of 
concentration have begun to emerge in 2012 along China’s geographical division centred on 
tier one cities such as Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Chongqing. By 2016, UCIB
has spread to a large part of middle China such as Hunan, Jiangxi, Hubei and Anhui, as well 
as, other regions such as Guizhou and Liaoning. A pattern of proximity to the ‘first tier cities’
could also be observed. There are some outliers along the border regions. However, over time
the centre has shifted to become more evenly spread between eastern and central China with 
clusters along major centres also become larger.  
Insert Figure 2
Figure 3 depicted average yield to maturity in the last 10 years and how relative risk 
was distributed across China. As can be seen, in the eastern coastal, southern and Beijing areas, 
the yield to maturity is relatively lower than middle, north-eastern and western regions. The 
eastern coastal and southern regions have considerably a higher amount of financial capital and 
more financial instruments. Even though these regions have issued a higher amount of UCIB
their relative risks remain lower. This is consistent with the eastern region reporting the lowest 
yield in Table 3. Relative risk premium explains spatial difference in terms of proximity to








   
 
   
    
 
    
  




   
 
  
     
  
   
     
  
    
  
   




   
    
 
Insert Figure 3
The figure shows that the financial market reveals the potential / relative risks of UCIB.
In the western and central regions, the relative risks are higher than that in the coastal region.
Different risk profiles as explained by relative risk premium also offer investors benefit of 
spatial distribution. An important dimension of UCIB is that it is embedded within a locality
and serves as a key linkage between financial capital and the real economy serviced by
infrastructure. As yield difference emerges between different localities, capital seeking higher
return is driven to the locality with higher relative yield/return, in the process, equalising the 
yield/return difference between regions. 
6 The Asset Class of UCIB and Financialisation
6.1 Creating an asset class
As an asset class, the UCIB is collateralised on real assets and is deemed less risky and
more senior than unsecured corporate bonds, and more volatile equity. Commercial banks in
China accounted for 80% of investment in primary debt market. Specifically, the share of
commercial banks in central and local government bonds were 67% and 87% in 2017. In 2018,
key investor in UCIB were commercial banks (70%), the policy banks (26%) and the stock 
exchange (3%) (CCDC, 2018). The holding varied by duration with 90% of one-year local 
government bond and 80% for bond maturity between 2-10 years owned by commercial bank.
The policy banks held about 15% of bond maturing between 3-10 years and non-legal person
(e.g. individual) held less than 1%. On the long end, typically 15-30 years, insurance company
owned around 30% with the remaining shared by commercial bank (12-32%) and non-legal
person (16-55%) (ibid). Stable yield, different maturities and risk profiles associated with
UCIB allow Chinese financial institutions to engage in maturity transformation through 
exposure to UCIB as an asset class.
Other than the asset holding reason identified above, the dominance of commercial
bank in UCIB financing needs to be understood in the context of the policy burden of credit
support to the state sector in the context of soft budget constraints (Lin and Li, 2004). However,







   
  
  
     
    
   
    
   
 
  







   
  
  
     
  
 
   
  
   





                                                 
  
     
showed 16 trillion RMB of UCIB (2.37 trillion USD) were rolled over and reorganised into 
project or special bond with longer maturity. Debt conversion is seen as a strategic response
by the state to three major issues facing the UCIB. First, between 2005 and 2017, local 
government financing platform (LGFP)’s average return on equity (ROE) or cost of equity has
been consistently below that of other non-financial entity. In 2017, ROE for UCIB was 2.4%,
for other non-financial entity, ROE was 6.4%. Second, debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)3 –
has been trending downward from 2005 and fell below one since 2010. In 2017, DSCR was
0.4, which meant operating earnings/cash flow was only 40% of current debt obligation. Third,
maturity mismatching occurred as average time to maturity was 2.9 years for debt held by 
LGFP between 2005 and 2017, which meant infrastructure projects with longer horizon of 
completion are likely to run into difficult with liquidity to service the debt early (Liang and
Liu, 2019). UCIB debt restructuring under the strategic guidance of the central government, in
effect, reduces maturity risk by prolonging the repayment period and made the asset more
accountable with its transformation to new type of project bond. 
A secondary market for bond is yet to mature but the private sector has already entered 
the predominantly inter-bank market for UCIB. The liquidity, although thin, is a trade-off with
stable yields for this asset class. Overtime, private sector participation in this asset class has 
given a popular name to UCIB as ‘silver gilded bond’ (Yin Bian Zhai). Following recent UCIB
debt restructuring, major banking institution such as the Bank of China (BOC) became the first 
to offer over-the-counter (OTC) service to retail investors (BOC, 2019). The first OTC BOC
subscription for RMB 100 million Beijing social housing UCIB was sold out within 3 days of 
issuance by the Beijing branch of BOC. Agriculture Bank of China (ABC) and Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) each obtained RMB 5.6 billion of total subscription for 
OTC sales and accounted for 56% of RMB 20 billion Beijing social housing project UCIB 
issuance (Beijing News, 2019). Private capital participation also increased with increasing 
demand from private equity. The underwriting of RMB 2 billion social housing UCIB with 7 
years of time to maturity would be appraised by 9 government regulations. The expectation is 
full interest coverage by project revenue and implicit understanding of 8% Internal Rate of 
Return (IRR) or the total cost of capital.  
3 Debt Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR) = EBITDA / (debt falling due in one year + interest expense). EBITDA 











   
  
  




   
    
       
     
  
     
 
    
  
  
   
   
  




    
  
       
 
 
6.2 Using UCIB to raise infrastructure finance
The development of UCIB has sped up the pace of financialisation of China’s financial
systems. UCIB plays a strategically important, yet constantly evolving role in capitalising and 
intermediating China’s infrastructure investment since 2008. At the start of global financial
crisis, China has followed an old fashion approach to engineer infrastructure-led growth and
uses the financial systems to serve the real economy. Since 2012, profound internal structural 
change has produced dynamics which limits the detrimental effect of debt as China’s policy 
swings towards supply side economics. 
Now returning to the example used in Section 3, AA+ rated, 16 Jiang Ning UCIB to 
show that UCIB has become an effective method to mobilise infrastructure finance. The bond
was issued in 10 November 2016 to be retired in 11 November 2023 (7 years’ Time to Maturity
from first issue). On 21 August 2019, the bond was trading at a discounted price of 99.217 (red
line) RMB with a coupon rate of 3.48%. Yield to maturity was 3.681% (green line). On the
same day, the yield of 10 years government bond was 2.82%. The difference between the two
was 0.86% (86 basis point) - the relative risk premium for holding 16 Jiang Ning UCIB as
compare with holding a ‘risk free’ 10 year’s government bonds. Compared with sample
benchmark such as equivalent duration AA+ rated, 3 years UCIB benchmark provided in Table
4, the average value of yield to maturity is 4.91%. 16 Jiang Ning achieved lower yield/risk 
level than the average benchmark of same maturity government bond (3.68% compared with
4.91% = 1.23% or 123 basis point), a signal for lower default risk compared with the average
of AA+ rated 3 years UCIB benchmark and holding time to maturity constant. In relative terms,
16 Jiang Ning also has lower relative risk/spread (0.86% or 86 basis point) compared with 3
years UCIB benchmark’s relative risk (4.91% - 3.54% = 1.37%, 137 basis point). 
Insert Table 3
The issuer of 16 Jiang Ning UCIB is Jiang Ning City Construction Company Limited,
a LGFP located in Jiang Ning district of Nanjing, the capital of Jiangsu province. As shown in 
Table 5, the issuer has issued six UCIB since 2015 and achieved a good long-term credit rating
of AA+ by China Chengxin Credit Rating Group, a key rating agency in China. A variety of 







     
  




    
  
  
    
 
    
     
     
 




    
 
 







   
 
     
equity bond traded in Shanghai Stock Exchange, and PPN (private placement notes) targeting
institutional investors in the inter-bank market. The average volume of capital raised was about 
1 billion RMB with average duration 4.67 years and average coupon rate of 4.12%. The 
company has been able to tap into capital market every few (1-3) months and successfully 
raised 6.2 billion from capital market between November 2015 and November 2016. 
Our example, 16 Jiang Ning UCIB belongs to a series of three 900 million RMB
issuance in 2016. Industrial securities Co. Ltd. was the lead underwriter for the first issue using
the private equity method resulting in 4.60% coupon rate. By second issue, the company has 
been able to use another lead underwriter GF securities using private equity method and 
reduced coupon to 3.59%. By the third issue (16 Jiang Ning UCIB), the company further
reduced coupon to 3.48% using corporate bond method and Industrial Securities for the second
time as lead underwriter. ‘Piggy backing’ on the success of its last five issues between
November 2015 and November 2016, the coupon rate was reduced from 5.36% to 3.48% with 
maturity extended from 3 to 7 years. Compared with UCIB benchmark rate of 4.91%, the first 
issue has much higher rate (5.36%) but by the second issue, the rate was reduced to less than 
UCIB benchmark. A well-developed, competitive capital market plays a crucial role for the 
company’s successful debt financing. Through several rounds of financing, the company has
also been able to price in its relative risk in each round by shopping around for different lead 
underwriter and sending signal to the capital market on its long-term credibility. This kind of 
flexibility is otherwise unavailable in local government debt markets.
Despite various problems and risks, the UCIB has emerged as an asset class in China’s
financial market with increasing private sector participation, thanks to the strategic role of the
state in timing the investment during the financial crisis and proactively regulating UCIB for a 
soft landing, through debt restructuring, and creating an active, increasingly private sector 
driven, secondary market for the UCIB which should serve to reduce the policy burden on the 
commercial banking sector. 
In this context, the research in this paper aims to provide the background to understand 
‘micro’ level dynamics of this important asset class in China’s financial market and offers some
utilities. Firstly, the tool enables asset managers, institutions and academics to understand the 







   
     








     
  
       
 
  
    
   




   
   
   
     
 




   
level of absolute risk, policy maker can use the framework of relative risk analysis to 
investigate the dynamic properties of risk and risk pricing mechanism through interaction with
the capital market. Both are important considerations to develop a ‘micro’ foundation for 
analysis UCIB risk. In this regard, our research differs from the existing approach on China’s
UCIB which tends to focus on absolute measure of risks such as stock and flow and exploring
aggregate impacts of a broad set of largely, macroeconomic variables (Pan et al, 2017). 
7 Conclusion
The UCIB is an emergent asset class which provides flexible financing to local 
government and attractive risk-adjusted returns to investors. It has sped up the financialisation 
of China’s infrastructure finance and plays a strategically important role in terms of strong
inter-bank financing of the infrastructure sector. Faced with the global financial crisis, China 
developed the infrastructure sector needed for further urbanisation. The existing literature has
understated the full potential and contribution of infrastructure as an asset class to China’s 
financial system and to the world economy. We argue that UCIB is fast emerging as an asset 
class which despite being owned in majority by the bank is nevertheless attracting private 
capital for financing. As an asset class, the UCIB has seen spatial distribution of different risks. 
The UCIB is embedded within a locality and serves as a key linkage between financial capital 
and the real economy serviced by infrastructure. As yield differences emerge between different
localities, capital seeking higher return will be driven to the locality with higher relative 
yield/return, in the process, equalising the yield/return difference between regions. 
This paper uses a relative risk framework to reveal different risks associated with
UCIBs. By elaborating ‘micro’ level dynamics of pricing and spatial differences, we are able
to demonstrate the risks associated with UCIBs such as geographical component and capital 
market interaction. the existing studies might have made policy maker overstated the risk 
associated with UCIB and understated the full potential and contribution of UCIB as a financial
tool for local government. The paper illustrates the importance of understanding different
‘micro’ layers of relative risks which made up idiosyncratic aspect of UCIB risks. Using
specific example of UCIB we assess the pricing of relative risk and show how the capital
market facilitates the financing of UCIB through signalling and repeated interactions. The







    
   




          
   
     
  
 
    
  
 
   
 
     
   
      
 
 






    
   
       
 
China’s real economy and financialisation. The continuous development of capital markets
particularly primary and secondary market, and the demand for UCIB through different
methods of issuance and securitisation offer investment opportunity which could help to 
provide China’s long-term future.
Due to the limitation on the length of this article, we have not been able to demonstrate 
a full model that examines a whole spectrum of ‘micro’ level relative risk factors and further
decompose their interactions. It is also not possible to model the interactions between UCIB
and other asset classes, e.g. equities and central government bond. The latter would help to
inform financial policy aims at financial contagion, at a time of crisis. This can be the direction
of future work using large-scale vector auto-regression model (VAR) to fully decompose UCIB 
relative risk into finer granularity. The dynamic relationships between UCIB yield, government
bond, equities and other asset classes can be estimated and modelled to demonstrate how 
financial instrument changes in respond to shock. This paper, by considering the spatial 
dimension of relative risk limits the decomposition to the idiosyncrasies associated with spatial 
layer of relative risk and using case study illustrates the pricing dynamics of risk by capital 
market. On policy side, understanding the volatilities of UCIB relative risk is critical to
understand the path of contagion across asset classes, and the magnitude of risk transmission,
therefore offers utilities for policy makers who are facing their ‘Minsky’ moment of asset price 
collapse and multiple asset class contagion during crisis. The view is based on a ‘micro’ level
instrumental understanding of UCIB as a financial instrument and the information contained.
Such ‘micro’ level understanding should be extended further to include more studies that 
examine how such instrument changes in respond to exogenous shocks and what it implies for
understanding the business cycle. 
By focusing on the relative risks, this paper does not suggest that UCIBs have already
become a viable market-based asset class. There are problems associated with the overall risk 
of infrastructure investment, local government debt, and macroeconomic conditions. The local
financial market is still affected by many issues such as financial irregularities. The credit
rating of UCIB issuance is still not entirely transparent. However, it is hoped that along with 
the development of the secondary market UCIBs would begin to reveal relative risks for 
investors to choose. The relative risks revealed by UCIB may also impose a constraint on risky
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